Prostrating to an Idol Without Intending It, and Swearing an Oath to a Man-Made Constitution السجود للصنم بغير قصد، والقسم على الدستور

Questioner: The second question: what is reported from Ibn Taymiyyah, that someone who prostrates to an idol while his heart is not at ease with it is not judged to have disbelieved — and those who cite this as evidence for swearing an oath to uphold man-made laws and to act by them.

[This was asked together with a question on the 'an'anah of Ibn Jurayj and Abu al-Zubayr; see Does the 'An'anah of Ibn Jurayj and Abu al-Zubayr Make a Hadith Defective?]

As for what you mentioned from Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah the Exalted have mercy on him) about prostrating to an idol: Shaykh al-Islam (may Allah the Exalted have mercy on him) — and others besides Shaykh al-Islam — establish, of course, that prostrating to an idol is disbelief in itself, and this is of course agreed upon by consensus. Even Ibn Hazm (may Allah have mercy on him) in al-Milal, when he mentioned from al-Jahm ibn Safwan that he says prostrating to an idol is disbelief, but only because it indicates disbelief, not because it is itself the disbelief — reflect on how Ibn Hazm makes this the view of the Jahmiyyah: the one who, in the end, does make prostrating to an idol disbelief, of course, but says: not in itself, but because it indicates disbelief, [not] because it is itself the disbelief. And despite that, this is the madhhab of the Jahmiyyah.

But yes, if he prostrated while intending Allah in his heart, not intending prostration to the idol, then this is different. Yes, Ibn Taymiyyah made this distinction, and other scholars made it too, because he did not intend to prostrate to the idol; he intended Allah and the Last Abode, but he faced towards it. But it remains that if we did not know his intention and judged him by the outward, this would be admissible — especially if he is not coerced and is complying with this matter. This, of course, is a summary of Ibn Taymiyyah's words that you kindly mentioned.

As for what you mention about entering parliaments and the like: there is a difference between what is shirk in itself and the issue of what has two aspects, like prostration. Prostration is sometimes intended as a greeting, and this is not disbelief, by consensus; there is no disagreement about this.

And sometimes it is intended as veneration and worship, and this is disbelief by consensus. As for the issue of shirk: shirk is forbidden in itself. But the first issue is built, at root, on his intention; because [if] he committed shirk — had he committed shirk, there would be no disagreement that he is a disbeliever, by consensus.

But the issue of parliaments and what relates to parliaments is an issue that concerns the thing in itself, not its wider dimensions, for example. A person swearing an oath to the constitution, for example — he swears by Allah on the constitution that he will rule by the constitution! I mean, there is even a contradiction in it! He swears by Allah to rule by other than the law of Allah! How can this be?!

Questioner: O Shaykh, it is like the contemporary experiences, I mean through the Arab revolutions that are taking place. Some of the shaykhs — among the senior shaykhs in some countries — would distinguish between disbelieving in the taghut and disbelieving in the other laws. It is an issue where we say there is a general and a specific: the general is that he disbelieves [in them] in general, completely; but now he is in a matter of ijtihad on a specific thing — he exercised ijtihad now in changing the situation they currently have. As for the root of the issue, he disbelieves in the taghut and disbelieves in the other laws; but now, while disbelieving [in them], he wants to repel the greater harm with the lesser harm?

This relates to declaring him a disbeliever; that is another issue. No, I do not say that.

We are speaking about this being forbidden and being disbelief; we are not concerned with the ruling on the doer and the one exercising ijtihad.

Questioner: Fine — and whoever calls to that?

That, now, is another issue; that is another chapter.

We reject this without doubt, but the issue of the doer is another issue, and it is not what Ibn Taymiyyah was speaking about in what I mentioned from him a little while ago.

The issue of the act now: the act itself — what is its ruling?

We are speaking about the act itself; we are not speaking about the ruling on one exercising ijtihad or one with an interpretation in a particular case. In principle we forbid this act; then if a person does it, that has other rulings.

النص العربي الأصلي